Dr Ros Kidd
Historian - Consultant - Writer
You Can Trust Me - I'm with the Government
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to describe how the system of state
management of Aboriginal wages was established in Queensland, and to
expose some of the deficiencies and distortions in the practical
application of the system throughout the twentieth century. The article
also examines the establishment of various trust funds to receive
Aboriginal savings and income derived from Aboriginal earnings through
the imposition of levies and through the state's appropriation of
accumulating interest. Finally, a critical analysis is made of the
state's manipulation of trust and welfare funds to reduce state
expenditure on Aboriginal affairs.
Setting up the system
Nearly 100 years ago, in 1897, the Queensland government enacted a major
piece of legislation which was intended to bring some measure of control
to social, sexual, and labour relations between the Aboriginal and
colonial populations. As well as addressing the problem of widespread
opium dealing, the Aboriginals Protection and Prevention of the Sale
of Opium Act created a legal distinction between `full-blood' and
`half-caste' Aborigines, it established administrative districts
supervised by local `protectors' who were usually district police, it
legislated for restricted reserve areas, and it prohibited the
employment of Aboriginal labour except by permit. As an indication of
the extensive Aboriginal workforce in those early days nearly 1200 work
permits were processed in the 12 months to June 1900. There was strong
opposition from many Aboriginal men and women to this administrative
intrusion. However abuses of labour, amounting virtually to unpaid
slavery, had not been eradicated.
In 1901 an amending Act introduced the concept of a minimum wage for all
Aboriginal labour,1
at a time when no such labour protection existed in Australia,
even for white workers. This provoked hostile objections, one
parliamentarian depicting it as the thin edge of the wedge, protesting:
What right have they to interfere with me as an individual employing
labour and expending capital?...If they have the right to interfere and
say what I shall pay the aboriginal who chops my wood or carries water
for me, or sweeps my floor or scrubs my house, have not they the right
to step in and say I shall pay my white employee a minimum wage?2
A rate of 10/- per month was set for boat workers, and 5/- for mainland
workers, exclusive of food, accommodation, and clothing. It was common
for employers to avoid paying wages by claiming workers had deserted or
died, so a trust account, the Aboriginals Protection Property Account,
was opened in Cooktown in 1902. Wages owing went into the fund for
payment to the worker or to relatives, or for use "for the benefit of
blacks generally".3
Control of the income of Aboriginal workers was started by Rev Gribble
at the Yarrabah mission before the turn of the century. He directed
that all wages of mission residents be paid to himself. He then passed
on only half to the wage earner, and pooled the remainder as a mission
fund to provide food and clothing for those who were too old or unable
to work.4
Control over savings accounts was introduced officially in Brisbane at
around the same time and applied to the earnings of Aboriginal women.
In the first years of the century there was a high demand for domestic
servants,5
and since 1899 there had been a `protectress of Aborigines' in Brisbane
whose specific duty was to monitor the employment of Aboriginal girls
and women, inspecting work conditions and ensuring wages were duly
paid. In 1901 nearly 70 Aboriginal domestics were working around
Brisbane, receiving wages of between 2/6 and 12/6 per week. The girls
were given pocket money only, and the remainder was banked in personal
accounts by the protectress and made available if the girls married or
left work to live on the government settlements. Three years later,
however, following complaints by Brisbane women to their member of
parliament, an official inquiry found the protectress herself guilty of
swindling the savings accounts, and she was forced to resign.6
In rural areas supervision was often lax due to negligence by local
protectors, and the department brought many successful actions against
employers for non- or under-payment of wages. It was not uncommon for
seasonal workers to be told that food and clothing had absorbed all
wages owing or to be cheated of their pay before they reached their home
camps. To counteract such swindles, regulations in 1904 provided the
possibility for wages to be paid directly to the local protectors, who
would then act as banker for the worker. Even so, fraud on accounts was
so common by both employers and protectors that a system of thumbprints
was introduced in 1904 to endorse withdrawals. In 1905 a policy was
adopted that all female wages must be paid to the protector,
although this remained optional for male workers,7
and a trust account was set up under the Home office, to handle received
wages.
Controls of wages and savings
During the first twenty years of the century, much latitude was allowed
in the matter of employment permits and savings control, particularly in
remote areas. Between 1906 and 1914 Richard Howard was the departmental
head, (until 1939 titled the chief protector), and in a tour of the
state in 1911 he noted many families supporting themselves through odd
jobs, and the trapping and selling of native animals and skins. He also
noted that many protectors took direct control of Aboriginal wages, and
he remarked that workers frequently compared notes on difficulties of
accessing their savings, a cause of much resentment. But in the far
west, he said, such controls were necessary:
Station managers...seem to have a deep-rooted objection to paying the
aboriginals anything for their services, unless it is coming back again
through the station store...8
On his retirement in 1914 the position of chief protector went to John
Bleakley, who held the office until 1942.
During the first world war Aboriginal employment was at a premium and
Bleakley immediately moved to increase the minimum wage. He also
formalised the compulsory payment of male wages through protectors,
arguing that enforced management of savings would ensure that workers'
families did not become dependent on government charity in the
off-season. Generally 50% of wages was banked directly into individual
savings accounts controlled by local protectors. But workers were only
allowed to withdraw about half of their earnings and only if the
protector deemed it a `necessary' expense. It was said that this
manipulation of income deprived each worker on average of £29 per year
of their earnings, a criticism Bleakley rejected.
The portion not directly banked was in theory paid to the
employee during the work period as `pocket money'. But no provision was
available for Aboriginal workers to sight either the `pocket money book'
or their own savings passbook, and the system was open to wide abuse.
The department ran no proper checks to ensure due `pocket money' was
received by the worker,9
nor did head office establish controls "to ensure that correct postings
are made to individual native's accounts" by country protectors.10
According to the government auditor, this negligence continued as late
as 1965.
Higher wages during the war years increased the accumulated credit
balance of country workers in 1915 alone by £12,475 to £56,855, and the
government reserved the bank interest to underwrite its own outlays for
food, rations and blankets. Bank interest due to workers living on
mission and settlements was disbursed as `Christmas cheer', courtesy of
the largesse of the chief protector.
In 1915 Bleakley proposed a tax on the already low earnings of
Aboriginal workers, arguing that a 10% levy on the compulsory bank
portion would encourage social responsibility for the "aged and helpless
relatives of men earning wages in employment". Bleakley calculated this
strategy would yield around £2,500 per year, which was more than £1,000
over existing government expenditure on Aboriginal welfare.11
Although he stated that the taxes would be set aside "for general
relief" of needy Aborigines, it is not surprising that many Aboriginal
workers were deeply suspicious of government control over savings
accounts, believing that their earnings were diverted to fund mission
development.12
The taxes were not brought in until 1919.
During the war the department applied to the Army for trustee powers
over the wages of the nearly 200 men who volunteered for military
service after the lifting of initial Army restrictions against
Aboriginal enlistment. Ultimately Bleakley gained control of 62
accounts, and imposed tight control over spending. He later described
this as "friendly restraint" and necessary to prevent "these lads...from
wasting their savings in drink, prompted by the loafers and parasites
anxious to relieve them of their money".13
By 1917 64 protectors throughout the state handled 3,553 permits for
male workers and 623 for females, as well as several hundred short term
permits. In June 1919 Bleakley's planned new tax - set at 5% for single
men and 2½% for married men - was imposed on all workers not living on
missions or settlements.14
The Aboriginal Provident Fund was set up as a special trust fund
to allocate this additional revenue as relief for workers and their
dependents when in need or unemployed. Bleakley also sought to gain
control of the accounts of all workers living on government
settlements. He argued before a Royal Commission into the public
service in 1919 that settlement superintendents had for several years
lacked the competence to handle either the management of institutional
development or the finances of their workers.15
His minister opposed such centralisation of finances.
In 1919 the department also brought out a set of regulations governing
the conditions, as well as the rate of pay, for Aboriginal pastoral
workers. The McCawley Station Hands Award of the previous year had set
wages and conditions for white pastoral workers. But Aboriginal labour
was specifically excluded from the Award since it was Bleakley's policy
to maximise Aboriginal employment, so reducing the numbers dependent on
state funding. The department set the new rate of pay for Aboriginal
pastoral workers at 2/3 of white rates. Although pastoralists argued
that this rate made Aboriginal labour too costly,16
the hypocrisy of such claims, and the prominence of Aboriginal labour in
the pastoral industry, was underscored by the massive jump in Aboriginal
earnings, from around £45,323 in 1917 to £61,842 in 1919. This surge
brought the savings trust fund to £120,000. So great was the windfall
to the government through its levy on these earnings that the Anglican
Archbishop of Brisbane accused the state of exploiting Aboriginal labour
as a means of reducing official expenditure.17
Frauds and swindles
The records show a stream of complaints over misappropriation and
malpractices by police protectors, leading to allegations in parliament
that several police had been sacked for swindling Aboriginal workers by
having them sign receipts for grossly inflated amounts.18
In April 1921 thumbprints were re-introduced as "a further safeguard" to
prevent illegal dealings on Aboriginal savings accounts, since many
workers could not read or sign their names. In an effort to eradicate
police swindles, protectors were now instructed that all prints were to
be witnessed by a "disinterested third party".19
There is evidence that police protectors also connived with station
managers to manipulate Aboriginal employment, refusing long term jobs in
order to keep good workers `on call' for selected clients at peak times.20
In a scandal at Wrotham Park in 1927 workers refused to reapply until
they were paid outstanding wages of nearly £200. The local police
protector terrorised the men and women, plied them with alcohol,
threatened to have them removed to Barambah, and locked them in the
poisons shed overnight. Under these threats they signed on.21
When an internal police inquiry took no punitive action against the
officer involved the minister leaked the inquiry to the press, prompting
the Police Union Journal to claim their members were being
falsely victimised.22
In 1922 a public service commissioner's inquiry exposed misappropriation
by the government of both the property account and the provident fund.23
The commissioner found that the former account, intended to receive and
distribute unclaimed earnings, was being operated as a suspense account
to cover departmental costs, refunds, transfers and advances. £1700 had
been diverted for improvements at the Barambah settlement and a grant of
£590 paid to the missions for maintenance expenses. Wages and sawmill
expenses worth over £1000 had also been appropriated from the fund.
The provident fund, comprised of a tax on earnings as a relief fund for
Aborigines in need, had also been milked to cover government costs of
£117 to transfer 70 people to the new Cape Bedford mission. The
commissioner expressed disgust that while the department had
commandeered over £3000 from wages during a disastrous slump in the
cattle industry in 1922, only £253 had been paid out for rations and
relief for needy Aboriginal families. In addition, the commissioner
found that nearly half the deductions from wages made by country
protectors were inaccurate, and he declared that Aboriginal people
should be extended the right to appeal against dubious handling of their
savings accounts.
Ten years later Bleakley was forced to admit there were still no real
controls over the practices of the 95 country protectors. In fact a new
public service inquiry in 1932 reported that pilfering from Aboriginal
savings was frequent and invariably executed in small amounts on
doctored receipts over long periods. The report stated that the policy
of denying Aboriginal workers the right to check transactions on their
savings accounts meant the opportunity for fraud existed to a greater
extent than with any other governmental accounts.24
By this time country protectors handled accounts in credit for nearly
£265,000, and it was decided that all savings accounts would now be
managed from head office in Brisbane, leaving a small residue only in
individual accounts. As the undersecretary stated, "This will go a long
way to minimise fraud by members of the Police Force who are
Protectors".25
Government deceit
The centralising of savings accounts at head office also increased the
government's capacity to evade its financial obligations. £200,000 of
the combined savings pool was promptly invested in commonwealth
inscribed stock, and the government pocketed the interest component over
and above the commonwealth bank interest of 2½% previously received on
Aboriginal bank accounts.26
Documents show the department was well aware appropriation of the
interest bonus was illegal.27
Also illegal was the investment, since 1923, of the bulk of the property
account and the provident fund, in commonwealth inscribed stock and with
the state electricity authority, with the government again pocketing the
interest to reduce state expenditure.28
With the onset of the worldwide depression of 1929 a range of creative
schemes was implemented to tap into accumulated Aboriginal savings.
Initially the government demanded that half the trust funds be made
available to cover budgetary cutbacks of 20%.29
Bleakley resisted this raid, but with the approval of both treasury and
of the public service commissioner he did implement a series of extra
taxes, including a 5% levy on savings balances of over £50, and a 2½%
tax on country savings accounts. Bleakley sought to disguise these
levies under the label of `administrative charges'.30
In addition, the state appropriated all provident fund deductions, 50%
of funds in the property account, the tax of 10% for married men and 5%
for single men rightfully available for settlement maintenance, the
excess interest generated by invested bulk savings, and patients
incarcerated in the Fantome Island hospital were charged 2/- per day
until their accounts dropped below £20.
Although the taxes on wages were authorised to boost distribution of
relief and rations to needy Aboriginal families, documents show that
between 1925 and 1935 nearly £19,000 was diverted to cover deficits in
funding. In answer to questions raised in parliament in 1935 regarding
use of Aboriginal savings to cover departmental shortfalls, Bleakley
deceitfully advised his minister to deny any such dealings on the
grounds that the money had been raised from `earnings' and not from
`savings'.31
In addition to misuse of the levies, the government was also raiding the
trust funds. Between October 1930 and May 1931 over £20,000 was
illegally drawn from the provident fund32
to cover the deficit in government grants.33
Records show this fund was so depleted that trust money from Palm Island
and Barambah settlements was transferred to keep it solvent.34
There is evidence that raids on both funds in 1931 to "relieve"
consolidated revenue totalled nearly £13,500, with a further £14,450
withdrawn in 1932.35
This range of withdrawals from Aboriginal earnings and savings was
laundered through the Aboriginal standing account, a treasury trust
account whose legal status was in fact limited to purchases for, and
profits from, settlement retail stores.
In the ten years from 1925 to 1935, covering both Country-National and
Labor governments, the two funds were milked of over £72,000 for
"departmental purposes". And for ten years after the depression,
despite annual protests from government auditors, the government
continued to divert trust monies to pay for mission and settlement
development, wages, costs of forced transfer of Aborigines to
settlements, rations, and grants to missions - all legitimate costs to
consolidated revenue.36
In 1941, following yet another damning public service report cataloguing
gross mismanagement of savings accounts and general maladministration,37
Bleakley resigned `on health grounds'. Deputy Cornelius O'Leary took
over as chief protector, and the government continued to operate
illegally on the trust funds.
The Welfare Fund, child endowment
When the government created the Aboriginal Welfare Fund in 1943, it
framed the regulations specifically to legitimise its customary
diversion of trust moneys to cover development costs of missions and
settlements, by stating that levies and taxes on Aboriginal earnings
could be utilised "for providing benefits to aboriginals generally".38
Started with an injection of £51,000 from consolidated revenue, plus the
balance of the standing account, the welfare fund received all interest
on invested funds, the 5% levy on savings accounts, and proceeds from
settlement stores and ventures such as sale of cattle and produce. Now
the welfare fund was set up as a balancing fund: all revenue from
Aboriginal earnings and enterprises was to be targeted for Aboriginal
development. The welfare fund was not authorised to finance
operational grants to missions, cost of relief to indigent Aborigines,
or costs of compulsory transfer of Aboriginal people from one area of
the state to another. The provident fund remained although deductions
from country workers were reduced to 5% for single men and 2½ % for
married men. Settlement workers were still docked 5% for single men and
10% for married men towards amenities and maintenance costs.
Welfare fund resources were soon diverted to capital projects. For
instance in 1945 the department acquired a property near Murgon to be
developed as an Aboriginal Training Farm for Cherbourg Aborigines. This
was purchased from the accumulated savings of country workers for
£6,400, with a further £1,000 extracted from the welfare fund for
setting up expenses, and was expected to return a profit of £500 per
annum. In 1946 a second training farm was established on crown land
near the Woorabinda settlement, again using £10,000 from `surplus'
savings account funds. By mid 1947 both properties were in debt and
O'Leary asked for access to a further loan of nearly £10,000.39
By January 1948 the welfare fund itself was nearly £18,000 in debt.40
In defence of his management, O'Leary denounced government pilfering:
Generally it must be accepted that Aboriginal Welfare Fund is bearing a
considerable amount of expenditure which truly could be regarded as
legitimate Vote expenditure, and in this category comes the cost of
removal of aboriginals, indigent, sick, and refractory.41
Another miscalculated business venture was the house bought in Cloncurry
in the mid 1940s for hospital patients and off-season workers. £450 was
outlaid from the welfare fund and the local protector later declared
that "every aboriginal in this Protectorate on the 19th December 1945
was compelled to contribute towards the purchase of the House".42
By 1949 the council inspector declared the house unfit for human
habitation, the building was condemned and demolished at a further cost
of £50. O'Leary admitted privately that the department made "a bad deal
and aboriginal funds were invested therein to their disadvantage".
A major difficulty in tracing the deployment of Aboriginal earnings is
the facile manoeuvring of funds between various sources to cover
shortfalls, with no regard to legal distinctions separating government
liabilities from Aboriginal `development' projects. In addition to
large sums previously shifted to investment stocks from the provident
fund and the property account (which was often brought to a nil
balance), lump sums from `excess' funds held by the government
settlements had also been invested to produce government revenue. The
files further show that such trust funds generated by specific
settlements were freely transferred to cover financial crises in other
areas or to provide revenue for departmental projects.
With the inflow of federal child endowment monies to Aboriginal mothers
in the 1940s, paid through the agency of the Aboriginal department, it
was suggested that the `surplus' of £10,000 in the accounts of country
mothers might be commandeered by the government for further investment
revenue. Perhaps sensitive to federal criticism of this illegal dealing
at a time when the department was actively pursuing federal funds,
O'Leary declared it might be "inadvisable" for the state to invest "the
property of individuals".43
The missions and settlements had immediately applied to gain control of
child endowment income and bulk payments went into their official
accounts as `institutions', with only a portion passed on to the
mothers. But the records show that the government made corresponding
reductions in grants to missions, and in 1952, with the welfare fund
deficit running at over £13,000, there is evidence that the Presbyterian
missions were so desperate that they were forced to apply child
endowment revenue for administration costs and to feed starving adults
and children.44
There is also evidence that the department poached child endowment for
capital ventures. When finance was required in 1954 for the building of
a transit hostel at Aitkenvale near Townsville on land purchased with
welfare fund holdings, documents show that the government advanced only
£2,000, and diverted the remaining £8,000 from Palm Island institutional
child endowment. In 1957 a further £3,100 from the Palm Island funds
was injected, plus £1,000 from the welfare fund.45
By this time the department was also using welfare fund holdings to pay
most of the wages bill for settlement workers.46
Investments and living conditions
It is apparent from internal records that, even before the wider
range of pensions became available to Aboriginal applicants in the early
1960s, the state government anticipated equivalent cuts to
department funding, in effect exploiting private pensions as public
revenue.47
This inflow of commonwealth allowances greatly increased savings account
balances and thereby the pool of trust monies handled by the
department. Rather than releasing its controls on Aboriginal savings
accounts to allow individuals to use this social security income to
improve their own living conditions, the department exploited savings
balances to produce revenue. In 1956 Aboriginal savings balances
diverted to revenue-producing investments in commonwealth stock totalled
£467,000, with a further £60,000 in a state electricity loan, and £4,950
lent to the Hopevale mission board. The drive for revenue was perhaps
at its most indecent when Aboriginal regulations were amended the same
year, allowing the government to offer Aboriginal savings for
development projects of regional hospital boards, for improvements to
white hospitals,48
at a time when overcrowding was so bad on the government settlements
that at Cherbourg many huts sheltered over 15 people.49
The Audit Report of 1959 shows investments totalling £622,000,
comprising £262,000 in inscribed stock, £60,000 to state electricity,
and loans to hospital boards of £65,000 to Toowoomba, £30,000 to
Townsville, £37,000 to Maryborough, £60,000 to Mt Isa, £93,000 to North
Brisbane, and £15,000 to Roma.50
The government continued to exploit this swollen pool of Aboriginal
earnings, diverting revenue to substitute for state expenditure rather
than to improve Aboriginal living conditions. At the same time it was
stated that the fund "is not in position to provide assistance" for
replacement of the burned sawmill upon which the Monamona mission
depended for its survival.51
As late as 1960 at Woorabinda many families still lived in earth
humpies, and suffered a fatal epidemic of gastroenteritis caused by
overflowing drains and unsafe drinking water.52
For decades the government received official complaints also about
disgraceful conditions on its country reserves. At Mt Isa circumstances
for local Aboriginal families were described as "appalling", at
Ravenshoe conditions had "called forth the condemnation of many public
bodies", and at Birdsville the squalor and lack of water produced such
skin infections and gastroenteritis that children were denied access to
the local school. Here O'Leary privately deplored that "men of good
standing with families and money" who were industrious and hardworking
should be reduced to such deplorable circumstances.53
Despite this litany of neglect O'Leary publicly boasted in 1961 that the
government's "progressive housing policy" meant that "practically every
native is adequately housed".54
At this time O'Leary did suggest that an amount of £50,000 be withheld
from general investment in expectation of a new government policy
towards improving housing for Queensland Aborigines.55
His suggestion was ignored, and the government continued to raid the
fund for items such as wages, trucks, and launches, which reduced it
from £62,832 to £27,800 in 1959 alone.56
When the Mapoon people were evicted from their mission in 1963, nearly
£3,000 of their own savings, "built up from deductions from
aboriginals wages over the years...for the benefit of the inhabitants"
was extracted from the mission fund to develop the Bamaga site to which
they were forcibly transported.57
In the same year, while conditions on Aboriginal reserves and
settlements continued to be criticised as pathological to Aboriginal
health, welfare funds were expended on projects such as reafforestation
worth £4000 at Hopevale mission suggested by local member Joh
Bjelke-Petersen,58
£950 on sewerage at the Aitkenvale hostel, and £950 on a new store at
Palm Island. Patently illegal were additional outlays from the fund of
nearly £10,000 spent on `removals' of Aborigines, and £585 on relief of
indigent country Aborigines, both government costs.59
In 1962 the scandalous use of Aboriginal earnings for white development
threatened to become a public issue when several members of parliament
were lobbied over an impending loan of £100,000 to the Redcliffe
hospital board. The member for South Brisbane wrote that he could not
conceive such an allegation could be correct.60
The Trades and Labour Council demanded information regarding the
investment of Aboriginal earnings. An internal memo shows that
revenue-producing Aboriginal and Islander trust monies totalled over
£987,000;61
a note on this letter said "Charles how much of this should be
passed on to the TLC?" It was decided to divulge nothing and direct all
queries to a reading of the annual report of the department. Despite
these massive investments, the department often lacked cash to cover
urgent needs of missions and settlements; in 1963 the department was
forced to seek an extra £25,000 in unforeseen expenditure to cover a
welfare fund deficit.62
It was not until 1966 that the department ceased the levies on
Aboriginal earnings which financed the provident and welfare funds, and
all savings passbooks were surrendered to the account holders. Even so,
the department maintained its control of the huge pool of accumulated
savings (the Audit Report 1966/67 showed the welfare fund gained
over $21,000 in `surplus interest'), and retained control of all child
endowment payable to children under five years of age on government
settlements.63
Federal funds and housing
In mid 1968, while housing and amenities for most Aboriginal families
remained pathological to health, internal documents show trust fund
advances of nearly $875,000 to various hospitals, $9,000 to the Wondai
and Ipswich councils, $140,000 in commonwealth stock, and $120,000 with
state electricity.64
In this year, pursuant to the 1967 referendum, the first injection of
$800,000 of commonwealth funds was made to improve Aboriginal housing in
Queensland. Contrary to strict instructions, the state refused to set
up a separate State Aboriginal Housing Trust fund account, leading
federal officials to question whether the money was legitimately
expended.65
In 1970 the welfare fund generated 23% of total departmental
expenditure.66
The department retained control of over 8,000 savings accounts, and in a
press release Killoran boasted that extensive cattle ventures of over
21,000 head of cattle worth $2m made the DAIA the biggest `cattle baron'
in the state. Proceeds of over $250,000 per year from sales went to the
welfare fund "for the benefit of the State's 50,000 `assisted'
Aboriginals and Islanders".67
However documents also show that the department continued to use the
fund to cover state expenses, with over $97,000 paid out for settlement
wages and nearly $5,000 for compulsory `removals' to settlements in
1972.68
At the same time the hospital at Hopevale had only one nursing sister
and eight beds for a population of over 500 people,69
and the Bamaga hospital, built with $600,000 from federal funds to
service a community of 1200 Aborigines, was still without a doctor
twelve months after opening.70
New regulations gazetted in 1972 provided that all rents on state and
federal housing, all institution child endowment, and all unclaimed
estates would go to the welfare fund as well as the proceeds from
enterprises on Aboriginal communities. The fund was to finance
purchases of goods for resale, trade materials, livestock, agricultural
equipment and machinery, wages and administration on communities and
farms, rental assistance programs, development of reserve industries,
and grants in aid at the director's discretion.
While the welfare fund financed these multiple commitments, funding from
the government for essential community services was grossly deficient.
The files show a continuation of appalling conditions on missions and
settlements during the 1970s. In a climate of endemic ill health,
housing surveys at Lockhart River showed between ten and nineteen people
to a dwelling,71
and at Woorabinda 83% of homes were labelled as overcrowded, 69% with
over ten occupants, one house sheltering twenty-eight people.72
Yarrabah huts also contained two and three families and most lacked
baths, basins, or hot water. Drinking water was often unfit for human
consumption.73
Scabies, salmonella, hookworm, and diarrhoea were common also at Palm
Island where some houses held three families totalling eighteen people.74
A Weipa survey found 104 children and 56 adults sleeping on concrete,
and called for 32 new houses.75
It is inconceivable in this context, that when an additional $6.1m of
commonwealth funds was offered in 1979 for rental assistance for needy
Aboriginal families through the state housing commission, the Queensland
government suspected a plot to undermine the authority of the Aboriginal
department and refused the funds until the commonwealth agreed to
departmental control.76
When it finally gained access to the revenue, the department once again
merged it through the welfare fund, despite directives that a separate
account be established.77
Official analysis shows that up until 1990 nearly $133m of Commonwealth
State Housing Authority money was passed through the welfare fund. But
when we relate this to expenditure on commonwealth/state housing
programs, we find a `surplus' to the state of $3.64m in the years
between 1980 and 1984, and a further `surplus' of $7.88m between 1985
and 1990.78
During the 1970s and into the 1980s, the state was also waging a bitter
battle against successive federal governments which demanded legal wage
rates be paid to community workers. Both Bjelke-Petersen and department
director Pat Killoran were adamant that the state would bear no
financial responsibility for any normalisation of wages. If Aborigines
demanded equal wages, then Aborigines would pay the penalty. In the
financial year 1971/72, when prime minister William McMahon tied
commonwealth/state housing subsidies to payment of full wages on
commonwealth/state housing projects, welfare fund diversion to wages
leapt from $25,000 to $97,500. In the years from 1972 to 1976 over
$1.13m of welfare fund holdings went to wages, rising to $2.16m in the
years 1977 to 1982,79
frequently exhausting the fund. In addition to this line of attrition,
the government also slashed community workforces and cut back or aborted
maintenance programs, often bringing essential services into crisis.
Indeed overcrowding and defective living conditions were so bad that in
1983 officers at both Edward River and Palm Island insisted they could
not demolish condemned structures because of acute overcrowding.
During the 1980s many department development ventures were consistently
unprofitable and welfare fund investments were capitalised to shore up
this expenditure drain. Documents show that between 1982 and 1988
department-controlled cattle ventures and community stores ran up a
deficit of $5.3m. But recent inquiries to catalogue assets and
operations of the fund are hampered because many asset acquisitions were
never registered according to professional accounting procedures. As
responsible officer, Killoran's range of authority was comprehensive and
his discretionary powers almost absolute. Although official
investigators have identified the probability that many operating
decisions may have been "unwise", indifferent accountability limits the
prospect of proven illegalities and negligence.
Conclusion
In conclusion, two general points can be made. First: Aboriginal people
under departmental control have laboured for most of this century with
limited access to their artificially low wages and have been further
penalised through a system of double and treble levies. From the
Annual Reports of the Auditor General it appears that hundreds of
Aboriginal workers in Queensland have also suffered fraud and
mishandling of their savings over many decades. Second: it seems that
governments often utilised that portion of earnings held `in trust' to
reduce state expenditure to the detriment of those families who remained
on Aboriginal communities.
If the political rhetoric of `freedom of information' is to be taken
seriously, all support must be given for Aboriginal inquiry into the
handling of their earnings, and also into the government's expenditure
of trust monies, both in the operation of community assets and ventures,
and in the subsidising of state costs. However the determination of
Aboriginal individuals and the goodwill of present departmental staff is
frustrated by decades of incompetent and defective record-keeping, and a
legacy of incomplete and missing files. With the present political
emphasis on Aboriginal accountability, both for future policy
directions and for organisational finances, this litany of
governmental mismanagement and maladministration over many decades,
and the damaging consequences for community workforces and
infrastructure, should form the background for any critical analysis.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
A shorter version of this article appeared in Queensland Review,
May 1994, the journal of the Queensland Studies Centre, Griffith
University.
1
The 1901 Amendment Act
primarily targeted Aboriginal girls and women, providing a range
of protective regulations designed to prevent sexual
exploitation, prevalent in remote areas. It now became illegal
to have a female Aborigine on a property or on a boat unless a
permit had been issued. It was common practice for men to be
`employed' in a ruse to gain access to women and girls.
2 Queensland
Parliamentary Debates (QPD), 1901 Vol LXXXV11: 213.
3 In the six
months to December 1902 the fund had accumulated over £200 (Annual
Reports 1902, 1904).
4 QPD 1901 Vol
LLXXXV11: 614. For the year 1899/1900 £180 was distributed in
this manner.
5 Upper class
Brisbane households at this time averaged four servants, and
most middle class households employed at least one. Many more
white girls worked as domestics than did Aboriginal girls (Thom
Blake, Excluded, Exploited, Exhibited: Aborigines in
Brisbane 1897-1910, Brisbane History Group Papers, No 5,
1987:52). A study of non-Aboriginal domestics in N.S.W. at the
time showed 40% of all women between 15 and 24 were in
employment, most as domestics, commonly working between 16-20
hours a day six or more days a week (Anne Summers, Damned
Whores and God's police, Penguin, Ringwood, 1975:309).
6 She had
swindled their accounts by deducting amounts allegedly "already
lent or spent" for fares, clothes, and pocket money (QPD
1906:1165). By 1906 the department was supervising the
employment of 121 girls, about 90% of the Aboriginal domestics
in Brisbane (Annual Report 1906: 2).
7 Queensland
State Archives (QSA) HOM J/16 20.3.06 - chief protector to
undersecretary.
9 QSA TR254
1B/69 Audit Report 1964/1965. Supposedly a pocket money
book was kept by the employer listing all money payments and
endorsed by the worker. It was found most amounts were written
up just prior to the end of the work period. Dispute of amounts
invariably was not supported by local protectors, and
jeopardised the chance of re-employment.
10 QSA TR254
1B/63 Audit Report 1963/64.
13 J. W.
Bleakley, The Aborigines of Australia, Jacaranda Press,
Brisbane, 1961: 170. After the war many ex-soldiers had
sufficient capital to buy small homes and farms.
14 Settlement
and mission residents were already taxed of 10% for married men
and 5% for single earners as a contribution towards amenities
and family support. Each settlement had a cash account to handle
these levies. Men with no outside employment worked on the
settlements for at least 24 hours per week without pay to
qualify for rations for themselves and their families.
15
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 1919-1920, Vol 1:460.
16 One
consequence of the higher wages and tighter conditions was the
eviction from many properties of the families of Aboriginal
workers, especially the very old and the very young. Although
Bleakley saw this in terms of the eradication of "exploited
cheap labour", the movement of many dependents to reserves
traumatised family relationships. The influenza pandemic of
1919 also resulted in a huge influx of families to reserves.
Bleakley later boasted that the framework of regulations set up
in 1919 controlled rural employment "virtually without a hitch"
for the next 26 years.
(Bleakley, op cit, 1961: 171, 172).
17 Anglican
Archives, Diocesan Year Book, Archbishop's address, 1919:
21.
18 QPD, vol
CXXXIV, 1919-1920:2570
[19] Police
Circular 21:3.
20 Bleakley
sent an official circular stressing that workers should be
employed for a full season, and not laid off from one week to
another to suit the employer (QSA A/38092 Circulars to
Herberton Protector - 19.11.35).
21 QPD, vol
CLI, 1927: 1308.
22 QPD, vol
CLI, 1928: 1284-1287.
23 QSA
TR1227:128 - 15.3.23 Report on the Office of The Chief
Protector of Aboriginals.
24 QSA
TR1227:129 9.11.32 - Report on the Inspection of the Office
of the Chief Protector of Aboriginals, 24
25 ibid,
14.3.33. A system of identification numbers for all account
holders was now also introduced.
26 QSA
TR1227:129 24.8.32 - Bleakley to undersecretary. By the end of
1932 total savings were given as £291,487, comprising 5,579
individual accounts averaging £54 each.
27 QSA
TR1227:129 19.9.31 - memo from undersecretary, who conceded
that commandeering of the interest bonus was "not in accordance
with Regulations".
28 QSA
TR1227:129 20.7.26 - Bleakley to undersecretary. Also note on
20.7.31 (same file) - Bleakley to undersecretary.
29 Department
of Aboriginal and Islander Affairs (DAIA) OF/2 30.6.41 -
Bleakley to undersecretary.
30 DAIA OF/2
30.6.41 - Bleakley to undersecretary
31 DAIA RK:62
6.11.35 - Bleakley to undersecretary.
32 QSA
TR1227:129 13.7.31 - list of remittances.
33 QSA
TR1227:129 9.11.32 - public service inspector's report on the
office of chief protector of Aboriginals.
34 QSA TR254
1A/188 25.6.31 - deputy chief protector Cornelius O'Leary to
undersecretary.
35 QSA
TR1227:129 15.6.31 - undersecretary to premier and treasurer.
36 Chief
Office Audit Report 1939/40. In 1936 trust investments of
£14,000 were redeemed in order to "relieve revenue", and
documents show that the government saved over £30,000 in the
1935/36 year alone "which would have been a charge against
Revenue had the account not been in operation" (QSA T1227:129
9.12.36 - memorandum). In 1938 a further £10,000 stock was sold
to cover a slump in the Torres Strait markets (QSA TR254 1A/188
1.7.38 - Bleakley to undersecretary).
37 QSA A/4291
29.7.41 - Investigation into the Sub-department of Native
Affairs.
38 QSA
TR1227:129 20.10.43 - treasury undersecretary to undersecretary
health and home affairs.
39 QSA TR254
4H/10 16.11.44 and 23.6.47 - director of Native Affairs Con
O'Leary to undersecretary. The purchases were initially
legitimised as investment `loans' at only 2% interest, with an
interest free period of five years.
40 QSA TR254
1A/303 2.3.48 - O'Leary to undersecretary.
41 QSA TR254
1A/303 24.6.48 - O'Leary to undersecretary. £8,000 was made
available from consolidated revenue to partially offset the
debit.
42 QSA TR254
7C/8 (i) 10.2.47 - Cloncurry protector to O'Leary. One man was
still pursued in 1947 for his contribution of £2, although he
had moved to Palm Island so his children could get schooling,
and had only £2/10/- in his account.
43 QSA TR254
1A/188 1.8.50 - O'Leary to undersecretary. Denied access to
their bankbooks, the 473 women would have had no way of knowing
the extent of their credit (totalling
£18,436), unless their local protectors informed them.
44 QSA TR254
1E/45 21.11.52 - O'Leary to undersecretary.
45 DAIA
01-001-002 - briefing paper (undated, 1990). From 1969 the
department actively prevented Palm Island residents from using
the hostel in order to force them to make individual
accommodation arrangements.
46 QSA TR254
3A/241 - note on file listing Palm Island wages 1956/57 and
1957/58.
47 QSA TR254
1E/58 14.7.59 - O'Leary to undersecretary.
48 QSA TR254
1A/188 14.9.56 - undersecretary to O'Leary.
49 QSA TR254
4B/15 19.8.55 - superintendent to deputy director.
50 QSA TR254
1B/51 Audit Report 1959. The Audit Report for
1958 showed the sum of £93,000 going to "Brisbane and South
Coast hospital board", not the North Brisbane board.
51 QSA T254
6J/16 2.1.58 - O'Leary to undersecretary.
52 DAIA RK:9
12.12.60 - report of Rockhampton health inspector.
53 QSA TR254
1D/145 14.8.58 - O'Leary to deputy director Patrick Killoran.
54 DAIA
1A/519 4.4.61 - O'Leary briefing for minister Henry Noble.
55 QSA TR254
1A/188 3.9.59 - O'Leary to undersecretary
56 DAIA
01-057-007 (QSA 1C/88) 12.10.60 - minutes of superintendent's
conference.
57 QSA TR254
6G/20 - Killoran to undersecretary.
58 DAIA RK:9
13.3.63 - O'Leary to director general, education department.
59 QSA TR254
1A/655 - Statement of summarised receipts and disbursements for
financial year ended 30.6.64.
60 DAIA RK:20
2.5.62 - Colin Bennett MLA to acting minister Gordon Chalk.
61 ibid,
19.6.62 - O'Leary to undersecretary. This letter further states
that single men were allowed 25% of their wage and married men
accompanied by their families were allowed 50% for living
expenses. Workers had limited access to the department's
appropriation of their wage and depended on the consent of the
protector. In 1964 alone these
deductions netted the department $35,000.
62 DAIA RK:73
17.6.63 - Cabinet Submission.
63 QSA TR254
3A/276 11.9.66 - Palm Island superintendent to Killoran.
64 QSA TR254
1B/80 Audit Report 1967/68.
66 QSA TR254
1A/723 - progress report to 1970 Welfare Conference.
67 DAIA RK:10
19.3.71 - press statement.
68 DAIA RK:147
- balance sheet for 1971/72.
69 QSA TR254
6B/61 5.10.72 - Dr Ian Musgrave to health department. Patients
had to travel to Cooktown for serious illnesses, emergencies,
and pregnancies.
71 DAIA
01-084-030 14.4.75 - liaison officer reports.
72 DAIA
01-084-027 December 1974 - Woorabinda liaison reports.
73 QSA TR254
15D/12 10.1.74 and 31.12.74 - Yarrabah hygiene officer's
reports.
74 QSA TR254
3D/35 16.10.73 - report of Dr A Davis, University of New South
Wales health team, following fatal gastroenteritis epidemic.
75 DAIA
01-084-033 4.8.71 - report of training liaison officer.
76 DAIA
1A/975 5.9.79 - Queensland Housing Commission to minister for
Works and Housing.
77 See DAIA
1A/975 for exchanges concerning the Commonwealth State Housing
Agreement.
78 Final
Report: Investigation into the Welfare Fund and the Aboriginal
Accounts.
79 Final
Report: Investigation into the Welfare Fund...
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